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ABSTRACT
This paper is based on the theory of the organizations as a network. I study the strategic alliances in 
the tobacco industry in Nicaragua. The study is more theoretical than empirical. I work with approaches 
in this field and any data of Central Bank of Nicaragua. My objective is to demonstrate that the firms in 
the tobacco industry are prone to enter in strategic alliances.
Keywords: Network Positions, Strategic Alliances, crowding positions, Tobacco Industry.
RESUMEN
Este artículo está basado en la teoría de las organizaciones como una red. Estudio la alianza 
estratégica en la industria del tabaco en Nicaragua. El estudio es más teórico que empírico. Trabajo 
con los enfoques existentes en la temática y algunas estadísticas del Banco Central de Nicaragua. El 
objetivo es demostrar que las empresas en la industria del tabaco están propensas a entrar en una 
alianza estratégica.
Palabras clave: Posiciones de redes, alianzas estratégicas, posiciones de hacinamiento, industria del 
tabaco.
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INTRODUCTION
Strategic alliances have become a topic of considerable 
interest to scholars of organizations, because alliances 
are now prevalent in many industries, and they 
inherently challenge the notion that organization are 
discretely bounded entities, researchers have labored 
to understand the antecedent conditions that lead to 
interfirm collaboration (Stuart, 1998). In the tobacco 
industry in Nicaragua has been a strategy alliance 
since the late 90´s.
Two central questions lead this paper. The first one, 
what motivates tobacco companies to form strategic 
alliances? The characteristics of organizations, such 
as their size or financial condition, predispose firms 
toward or against engaging in certain actions. In 
empirical work a variety of firms attributes, including 
size, age, scope, and resource endowments affect 
the propensity to enter into alliances. The second 
question, how does the tobacco company position in 
the industry affect its propensity to enter in strategic 
alliances? Alliances are driven in large part by the 
opportunities tied to a firm’s position in its external 
environment. The firms will enter alliances only 
when they possess exchange partners with whom 
they forecast a high probability of a strategically or 
financially beneficial collaboration, and the availability 
of such partners is very often the binding constraint on 
alliance formations.
Although the tobacco industry in Nicaragua is very 
important, there are no papers that address the issue 
of strategic alliances. My hypothesis is that crowding 
positions affects the industry´s propensity to enter into 
strategic alliance. From the perspective, I point out a 
case that led to the formation of alliances in the last 
decade.
FRAMEWORK
Network form organization
Prior to the middle 1970s, economists had largely 
regarded the organization as a black box that is to 
be understood as a production function converting 
inputs to outputs. In the middle 1970s and early 
1980s, economists started to look inside the black 
box, and two perspectives in particular became quite 
prominent: principal agent theory and transaction cost 
economics. At least when they first emerged, each 
perspective was grounded in a dichotomous view of 
economic organization: markets and hierarchies.
From a purely structural perspective, the trichotomy 
among market, hierarchy, and network forms of 
organization are a false one. Markets and hierarchies 
are simply two pure types of organization that can 
be represented with the basic network. Each market 
actor is a node that lacks any ties to the other actors 
or nodes. A hierarchy is a centralized network in which 
the vast majority of ties flow to or from one particular 
node. In effect, from a structural perspective, every 
form of organization is a network, and market and 
hierarchy are simply two manifestations of the broader 
type.
A network form of organization as any collection of 
actors (N≥2) that pursue repeated, enduring exchange 
relations with one another and, at the same time, lack 
a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and 
resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange 
(Podolny and Page, 1998). The network form is a form 
of governance.
This definition of a network form of organization 
includes a wide array of joint ventures, strategic 
alliances, business groups, franchises, research 
consortia, relational contracts, and outsourcing 
agreements. This definition excludes most pure 
market arrangements such as short term contracts or 
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spot market transactions, and it excludes employment 
relations.
The social network approach views organizations in 
society as a system of objects (e.g. people, groups, 
organizations) joined by a variety of relationships. Not 
all pairs of objects are directly joined, and some are 
joined by multiple relationships. Network analysis is 
concerned with the structure and patterning of these 
relationships and seeks to identify both their causes 
and consequences (Tichy et al, 1979).
Functions of network organization
The network forms allow participating firms to learn 
new skills or acquire knowledge, gain legitimacy, 
improve economic performance, and manage resource 
dependencies. It considers each of these proposed 
advantages separately:
• Learning. Network forms of organization foster 
learning because they preserve greater diversity 
of search routines than hierarchies and they 
convey richer, more complex information than 
the market. First, they can encourage learning 
by promoting the rapid transfer of self-contained 
pieces of information. The network ties are 
conduits or channels. Second, may foster learning 
by encouraging novel syntheses of information 
that are qualitatively distinct from the information 
that previously resided within the distinct nodes. 
The network becomes the locus of innovation.
• Legitimation and status. If an actor partner 
in a network form of organization possesses 
considerable legitimacy or status, then the actor 
may derive legitimacy or status through the 
affiliation. This has a number of positive economic 
benefits for the actor, ranging from survival to 
organizational growth to profitability.
• Economics benefits. In elaborating functions 
by the network form of organization is important 
the direct economic benefits in terms of costs and 
quality. By fostering greater communication than 
the market does, network forms of organization 
facilitate greater coordination in the face of 
changes whose significance cannot be completely 
conveyed or understood through price signals.
• Others benefits. The resource dependence 
can alleviate sources of external constraint or 
uncertainty by strengthening their relationship with 
the particular sources of dependence and small 
firm networks provide individuals with greater 
autonomy, lead to less inequality in the distribution 
of wealth, and foster a greater sense of community.
Strategic interdependence
The strategic interdependence between organizations 
describes a situation in which one organization 
has resources or capabilities beneficial to but not 
possessed by the other. Many organizations face such 
interdependence, because of their need for resources-
not only money, but also resources such as specialized 
skills, access to particular kinds of markets, and the 
like (Gulati quoiting to Aiken and Hage, 1968).
A strategic interdependence perspective on alliance 
formation suggests that firms will ally with those with 
whom they share the greatest interdependence. This 
proposition has been explored at numerous levels 
of analysis. The role of resource contingencies is 
an important predictor of a firm’s proclivity to enter 
alliances.
Alliance formation and social structure
An alliance is any voluntarily initiated interfirm 
cooperative agreement that involves exchange 
sharing, or codevelopment, and it can include 
contributions by partners of capital, technology, or 
firm-specific assets (Gulati, 1995). The social network 
of alliances is dynamic and evolves as new alliances 
are formed. A firm’s position in the network is thus the 
result of both its own past alliances and those of other 
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firms in the network. Since new ties alter the very 
social network that moderates their formation, there is 
an active interplay between action and structure in this 
framework that is best observed over time.
Discovering new alliance opportunities and finding an 
appropriate partner that desires an alliance requires 
very good access to market information. Firms need to 
know about the reliability of potential partners as well. 
Information thus has a twofold purpose, it makes firms 
aware of viable partners, and it serves as a basis for 
trust between partners. Firms can learn about potential 
alliance opportunities from many sources, and one 
important source is their network of prior alliance.
The social structure guides firms’ alliance decisions 
can be understood by examining both the riskiness 
of alliances and the organizational processes that 
underlie alliance decisions. First, it makes potential 
partners aware of each other’s existence. Through 
such networks firms learn about each other’s existence 
and also each other’s needs, capabilities, and alliance 
requirements at a given time.
There are two different theoretical explanations for 
firms’ actions. In figure 1, information is depicted as 
freely available and equally accessible to all actors. 
Firms in such a context are rational actors that are 
aware of the strategic interdependencies they face 
and systematically identify partners through whom 
they can resolve those interdependencies.
Figure 1: Structure interdependence theory of alliance 
formation (Gulati, 1995)
The strategic actions of firms are the outcomes 
of matches between their competencies and 
new opportunities. Current and desirable future 
competencies are the primary basis for strategic 
interdependence between firms. The perspective is 
focusing exclusively on strategic interdependencies 
as drivers of alliances, but ignores factors that may 
lead to the availability of alliance opportunities in the 
first place.
The social structural model in figure 2 points to the 
important role of social networks in guiding firms’ 
actions. The social network of prior alliances is an 
active network of information exchange in which firms 
learn about the reliability and specific capabilities of 
current and potential partners. This exchange reveals 
to firms alliance opportunities they would be unaware 
of otherwise.
Figure 2: Social structural theory for alliance formation 
(Gulati, 1995)
The feedback loop from action to social structure in 
figure 2 indicates the dynamic and iterative relationship 
of two factors over time in the current context: New 
alliances alter the social structure that influenced their 
creation.
Two distinct components of social structure are 
relevant:
• The relational component of social structure 
provides direct experience based knowledge 
about current and prior alliance partners;
• The structural component provides indirect 
knowledge about potential partners that firms 
obtain from prior partners, their partners, and the 
latter’s partners, and so on.
The relational and structural components of social 
structure are influential in alliance formation.
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Alliances with private benefits, common benefits 
and relative scope
There are two different kinds of benefits available to 
participants in learning alliances (Khana et al, 1998): 
• Private benefits are those that a firm can earn 
unilaterally by picking up skills from its partner 
and applying them to its own operations in areas 
unrelated to the alliance activities. 
• Common benefits are those that accrue to each 
partner in an alliance from the collective application 
of the learning that both firms go through as a 
consequence of being part of the alliance; these 
are obtained from operations in areas of the firm 
that are related to the alliance.
The scope of the alliance refers to a need that both 
partner firms have agreed to target (the introduction 
of a new product or the provision of a new service), 
typically corresponding to some subset of markets in 
which the firms are themselves involved. The overlap 
between the scope of the alliance and the total market 
scope of each partner is likely to vary and influence the 
available private and common benefits. The greater 
the overlap between alliance scope and firm scope, 
the higher are the common benefits and the lower are 
the private benefits. 
The figure 3 depicts this link between relative scope 
and the nature of benefits.
Figure 3: Schematic for argument (Khana et al, 1998)
Consider an alliance between technologically 
advanced firms A with a firm B in a developing country 
with the objective of introducing a product P that A is 
familiar with into B’s country. Here firm A tries to learn 
about the market for P in the developing country from 
firm B, while firm B tries to access firm A’s superior 
technology. Firm A will have the opportunity to use 
what it learns from firm B (regarding marketing 
products in firm B’s country) to market other products 
that it is capable of producing, the more so the more 
transferable this marketing knowledge is to these 
other products. Similarly, firm B can use its product 
knowledge gained from firm A in other product or 
geographic markets beyond the scope of the alliance.
Strategic learning behavior
The learning process postulated in these economic 
models is that a firm earns private benefits as soon 
as it has learned enough to apply this learning to 
its operations (benefits being earned following the 
completion of some amount of learning). Common 
benefits, however, are available only once both 
partners have learned enough to be able to creatively 
synthesize their knowledge bases (this synthesis 
is only likely to occur after each firm completes its 
learning). Thus, private benefits are realized by a firm 
prior to common benefits being realized by both firms.
All firms must finish learning in order for any of them to 
derive the common benefits. Thus, there is no incentive 
for firms to try to get ahead of each other, or to try 
and finish learning in an effort to reap private benefits 
before their partners have finished learning. In such 
a situation of pure cooperation, resource allocation 
decisions are best made jointly. Both firms agree on 
the amount of resources that it is optimal to allocate 
given the particular stage of the learning process; in 
effect, for the purposes of resource allocation, they act 
exactly as one firm would.
Consider an alliance from which the partners can earn 
only private benefits. The firms set out to access each 
other’s knowledge but there is no common purpose 
to which they expect this knowledge to be applied. 
Instead, each firm wishes to access the knowledge of 
the other in order to apply it to situations in which it 
can reap benefits that accrue only to it, and not to its 
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partner. In such a situation, once one firm has learned 
enough from its partner, it has no incentive to continue 
to incur the costs of staying in the alliance (since there 
are no common benefits, which only accrue once both 
firms have finished learning, to continue to hold out for), 
and the firm will choose to terminate its involvement. 
Knowing this, each firm wishes to avoid being in the 
situation of being the laggard in the learning process; 
in effect, a situation of pure private benefits causes 
firms to race against each other.
The behavior patterns sketched out for pure common 
benefits on the one hand, and for pure private benefits 
on the other, represent extremes. Most alliances lie 
between these extremes; firms expect both private 
and common benefits, and exhibit behavior patterns 
that are an amalgam of those associated with the 
extremes. The lower the ratio of private to common 
benefits, the closer an alliance approximates pure 
cooperation and jointly profit maximizing resource 
allocation, and the less the resource allocation differs 
from the optimal pattern under unilateral learning. 
Khanna et al (1998) have established that a firm’s 
propensity to engage in competitive racing behavior 
in the context of a particular alliance may be related to 
activities of the firms that are not within the scope of the 
alliance. Further, since the firm’s resource allocation 
at a point in time is determined by its expectations of 
forthcoming private and common benefits (conditional 
on its own estimation of its learning and that of its 
partner).
Network positions and alliances opportunity
Network theorists have investigated the structural 
antecedents of interfirm alliances. Scholars working 
within the embeddedness perspective associated 
with Granovetter (Stuart, 1998) have argued that 
an established network of interorganizational 
relationships is a resource that facilitates the 
establishment and governance of future alliances. 
The central idea is that social ties convey access to 
reliable, inexpensive information about the quality and 
trustworthiness of the actors in a network. According 
to Gulati (Stuart, 1998) in empirical work on alliances, 
the patterned diffusion of information about potential 
alliance partners through the existing intercorporate 
network is viewed as the mechanism that connects an 
established alliance network to the formation of new 
business associations.
Although theoretical discussions of embeddedness 
theory have been broadly concerned with how social 
and economic structures affect economic exchanges, 
empirical strategic alliance studies in this tradition have 
attended to the much more limited question of whether 
and how interorganizational alliance networks, once 
formed, shape the establishment of relationships in 
future periods. Because the causal motor in these 
studies has been the circumscribed diffusion of 
information through the network of prior cooperative 
activity, questions such as how newly founded 
organizations, new entrants into an industry, and firms 
that have not previously formed alliances gain first 
entry into the alliance network have been outside the 
purview of extant, empirical embeddedness studies.
Alliances are volitional relationships; a lack of access 
to a good set of willing exchange partners is a limitation 
on many organizations’ ability to put into place a 
productive cooperative strategy. The originators of 
intercorporate relationships are the factors that create 
opportunities for profitable associations, and the lack 
of these opportunities is the constraint on alliance 
entry.
Unlike network theorists, Stuart (1998) focus in 
network position (high technology industry) approach 
for two reasons:
• Because prior alliance activity is not a prerequisite 
for collaboration in the empirical models (although 
prior innovative activity is a precondition).
• Because it influences whether, when, and to 
what extent firms have opportunities to establish 
beneficial strategic alliances.
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Two dimensions of technological positioning, crowding 
and prestige, underpin the paper’s theoretical 
argument and the empirical models. Organizations 
occupy crowded technological positions when many 
other firms concentrate in their areas of technological 
specialty and so are undifferentiated from them.
When organizations occupy crowded positions, 
it is because many of the technological areas in 
which they participate are concurrently pursued by 
many competitors. The figure 4 portrays the uneven 
population density of organizations across the regions 
of the two-dimensional technology space of the 
semiconductor industry in 1991.
Figure 4: Dispersion of semiconductor firms in technology 
space (Stuart, 1998).
The image conveys the fact that the semiconductor 
firms were irregularly dispersed across the 
technological landscape of the industry: a swarm of 
competitors converged around some organizations, 
while other firms were relatively distant from their 
nearest competitors.
For three reasons the firms in crowded technological 
positions will form alliances more frequently than 
otherwise comparable organizations that make their 
living in relatively unpopulated areas of technology:
• Distance between two firms in their technological 
foci can interfere with their ability to collaborate 
effectively. As a general rule, organizations are 
better able to evaluate and internalize the know-
how of technologically similar firms.
• Effort is continuously duplicated within them as 
undifferentiated firms independently invest in the 
development of related technologies.
• They have an established presence in the 
technologies that represent one of the centers 
of activity in a market; other organizations may 
seek access to firms in technologically crowded 
positions for the purpose of functionally integrating, 
bundling, or otherwise associating their products 
with one of a market’s core products.
Technological prestige influences alliance formations 
because it affects the number of partners available to 
a firm and an organization’s ability to secure favorable 
terms in alliance contract negotiations. Prestigious 
organizations are desirable associates because their 
strategic undertakings are focal points that draw the 
attention of external resource holders. Hence, potential 
customers and employees, the financial community, 
as well as the media and trade press are likely to 
become attentive to the initiatives of the affiliates of 
well-regarded firms. In this way, attention is directed 
and status is conveyed through interorganizational 
associations. As a result, a firm’s reputation and its 
ability to mobilize resources are likely to improve when 
it formalizes an alliance with a high-prestige partner.
EMPIRICAL
Strategic Alliances in Tobacco Industry in 
Nicaragua
Once aboard the theoretical relation to the organizations 
as a network. I focus on the study of the tobacco 
industry in Nicaragua. Among the tobacco products 
are derived (BCN, Revista de comercio exterior 2011): 
the cigarettes, cigars, pipe mixture, snuff of chewing 
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and snuff power. I make more reference to the cigars 
companies.
Currently tobacco is producing in the departments of 
Estelí and Nueva Segovia (more than 80% percent 
of production). Another area, but to a lesser extent 
is the Ometepe island. Funding for the production 
of tobacco branch is given by trading companies, 
which provide the necessary resources to producers 
to cover production costs. Then, this production is 
bought entirely by those companies. In free trade 
mode, there were 10 companies, which in 2003 export 
$ 13.5 million (figure 5) and are located mostly in the 
department of Estelí. Three companies export 70 per 
cent of national production.
Figure 5: Export and average price of tobacco branch 
(BCN, Revista de comercio exterior, 2011)
The most common variety of tobacco in Nicaragua is 
known like Habano, because it is from Cuba, but there 
is a variety Connecticut in smaller proportion. Although 
the tobacco industry in Nicaragua dates back to the 
60´s, the first attempt to form alliances start in 1997 
with the Association for Nicaraguan Cigars, in order to 
create stability in the tobacco industry. That effort was 
maintained, but until 2006 the initiative was revived and 
reactivated the association. In 1997 was the boom of 
the prices of the tobacco, but in 1998 the prices began 
to the fall, the sales fell and every company is looking 
for how to deal the crisis of tobacco alone. That made 
the companies put a little attention to the association. 
In the last decade, the tobacco of Nicaragua has 
improved markedly in quality. So that, the cigars export 
has increased. Nicaragua is the country with fastest 
growth in the United State of America (US) market, 
after Dominican Republic and Honduras. The cigars 
export in the last six years can be seen in the figure 6.
Figure 6: Cigars Export (BCN, Exportaciones fob)
According with the date from the Central Bank of 
Nicaragua (BCN in Spanish), Cigars export decreased 
in 2008 due to the international crisis. Although, how 
percentage of the total exports, its decreasing is 
greater in 2010 as shown as in figure 7.
Figure 7: Cigars export between total exports (BCN, 
Exportaciones fob)
Currently the association is composed approximately 
20 organizations. They are the largest manufacturing 
tobacco industry of Nicaragua, located in Estelí such as 
Padrón, Latin Cigars, Plasencia Group (Segovia Cigar, 
Tabaco de oriente and Protanic), Esperanza Cigars, 
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Natsa, Drew State, Taolisa y Joya de Nicaragua. Also 
the companies that make up boxes for cigars like 
Tabaco Home and independent producers; they are 
an important link in the tobacco production (Fonseca, 
2007). This industry generates more than a third of 
employment in the region.
In light of the theories on organization as network, the 
tobacco industry in Nicaragua has formed a network 
organization with different actors (firms, suppliers of 
materials and producers); they are working to survive 
in an increasingly competitive market. In this context, 
the network has advantages for actors, which not only 
involves learning process and economics benefits, 
but the legitimation and status (Points Poldony and 
Page, 1998), as well other benefits related to funding 
sources in common. In this sense, the organizations 
face a strategic interdependence within the alliance in 
formation.
On other hand, access to market information in this 
network is very important, because the big firms share 
that information to other actors in the network. The 
social structural in this industry have an important 
role of social network, because the prior alliances (in 
1997) prove information for new alliances (in 2006). 
The president of the association, Nestor Plasencia, 
expects more companies enter in this alliance when 
they watch the results of the association through its 
benefits (Fonseca, 2007). 
The benefits are private and common, because in this 
industry every company can earn unilaterally by picking 
up skills from its partner and applying them to its own 
operations in areas unrelated to the alliance activities. 
For example in 2008 as a result of a productive alliance 
with Drew Estate, Joya de Nicaragua managed to 
close with a growth of 30% over the previous year (La 
Gente, 2009). Common benefits are obtained from 
operations in areas of the firm that are related to the 
alliance. For his part, Drew State has benefited from 
alliance in many ways; one of them is the use of the 
international store of tobacco that belongs to Joya de 
Nicaragua. The scope of the alliance between two 
firms is to maintain quality tobacco that projects both 
trademarks in the international market. This would 
lead to an increase in common benefits that impact on 
the private benefits. These companies are an example 
of joint learning process, because both must finish 
learning in order for any of them to derive the common 
benefits.
In this industry prior alliances are important for 
formation of the future alliances, though it is not a 
necessary condition, because the association has 
been maintained through the time and now whit a 
greater amount of companies, because the firms trust 
each other.
In the tobacco industry there are two dimensions 
positioning like in the high technology industry. 
However, both dimensions tend to be one, because 
they are not differentiating. A prestige company can be 
part of a crowded position. This is due to the fact that 
tobacco companies in Nicaragua are concentrated in 
a region.
Different elements motive to tobacco companies to 
enter in strategic alliances such as size, age, scope, 
and resource endowment. The alliances in tobacco 
industry established through the association there 
are companies of different sizes and ages, although 
the majorities are large companies. There are also 
many young companies in the industry, which they 
has ten years of existence. With respect to resource 
endowment old and young companies do not have 
greater differences.
Recall that the company´s position in the industry 
affects their propensity to enter the alliance, because 
the distance and concentration are a key factor. The 
companies of the tobacco industry are in crowding 
position, where exist prestigious companies that 
transmit some of their knowledge to other companies 
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within the alliance. The main goal in this industry is 
to improve their performance and survive in the long 
term. This performance improves with the high quality 
in the tobacco and to enter in the new market. Actually, 
the main market for tobacco companies is the United 
States of America, followed by Europe, but their joint 
strategy is to enter in Asia, without neglecting its 
current niches markets.
CONCLUSIONS
My purpose in this paper has been to demonstrate 
that the firms in the tobacco industry in Nicaragua 
are propensity to enter in strategic alliance. One case 
is the alliance between two big companies: Joya de 
Nicaragua and Drew State. There are many factors 
that affect the propensity to enter into alliances. The 
crowding position in the industry is very important, 
because the majority firms are in the same area (Estelí 
department). However there are firms in prestigious 
position like the companies above mentioned.
The alliances network facilitates the formation of 
new interorganizational associations (firms, supplier 
materials and producers). The firms with many 
previous alliances benefit from a form of relationship 
or social capital that provides them with privileged 
access to potential exchange partners. Many scholars 
have suggested that the alliances are now prevalent 
in many industries and mark the emergence of a 
new and superior organizational architecture called 
network form. Accordingly, they have demonstrated 
that alliances can facilitate learning, enhance status 
or legitimacy, and contribute to organizational growth. 
This can be evidenced between the alliance of Joya 
de Nicaragua and Drew State.
I conclude that several concepts of the network 
organization are applied to the study of strategic 
alliance in the tobacco industry, which it has particular 
characteristics that could not be generalize to other 
industries. This paper has been a small contribution in 
study a very important sector of Nicaraguan economy, 
since the point of network organizations. Although, the 
lack of sector information could not extend beyond 
that presented in this paper. However, it can be the 
basis for further study of the industry with this and 
other approaches.
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